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CARPENTER’S LEGACY: LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE 
ELECTRONIC PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE 
Sarah A. Mezera* 
One of the most significant challenges confronting courts and legal scholars in 
the twenty-first century is the application of Fourth Amendment doctrine to 
new technology. The circuit split over the application of the private search 
doctrine to electronic devices exemplifies how courts struggle to apply old 
doctrines to new circumstances. Some courts take the position that the old 
doctrine should apply consistently in the new context. Other courts have 
changed the scope of the old doctrine in order to account for the change in 
circumstances. The Supreme Court took the latter position in Carpenter v. 
United States and held that the third-party doctrine does not apply to cell-
site location information records. The Court’s willingness to limit the scope of 
an established doctrine to preserve fundamental privacy interests suggests 
that Carpenter is just the beginning of a dramatic shift in Fourth Amend-
ment law. This Note argues that the circuit split over the private search doc-
trine should be resolved by creating a narrow electronic private search 
doctrine based on the logic of Carpenter. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent and rapid advances in technology challenge traditional legal doc-
trines. The Fourth Amendment is one particular area of law facing such 
challenges.1 The animating principle behind the Fourth Amendment has not 
changed in light of the digital age—individual privacy interests are weighed 
against important government interests.2 But the fundamental and pervasive 
changes that accompany technological advances potentially alter the way 
that balance is struck. As technology continues to evolve, courts and legal 
scholars face important questions of how to preserve, amend, or reject exist-
ing Fourth Amendment doctrine. 
One of the most notable recent changes to Fourth Amendment doctrine 
occurred in Carpenter v. United States.3 In Carpenter, the Supreme Court 
protected individual privacy interests by declining to extend the third-party 
doctrine to cell-site location information (CSLI).4 The third-party doctrine 
has been a part of Fourth Amendment law since 1976,5 and it has been ex-
tended numerous times by the Court.6 Yet the Court in Carpenter found that 
CSLI is a qualitatively different category of information to which the third-
party doctrine does not apply.7 This limitation of the third-party doctrine 
raises an important question: Should the capability of technology to amass 
incredible amounts of information similarly limit the scope of other doc-
trines under the Fourth Amendment? 
The private search doctrine is closely related to the third-party doctrine 
at issue in Carpenter8 and is a microcosm of the challenges the Fourth 
Amendment faces in the twenty-first century. Under the Fourth Amend-
ment, government agents are generally required to get a warrant based on 
probable cause to conduct a search of persons or property.9 There are, how-
 
 1. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitu-
tional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004). 
 2. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 407 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Many cell 
phones now in use are capable of storing and accessing a quantity of information, some highly 
personal, that no person would ever have had on his person in hard-copy form. This calls for a 
new balancing of law enforcement and privacy interests.”). 
 3. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 4. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
 5. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held repeatedly 
that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third 
party and conveyed by him to Government authorities . . . .”). 
 6. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (applying the third-party doc-
trine to a pen register). 
 7. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218–19. 
 8. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 130 (1984) (White, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). 
 9. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted outside the 
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated ex-
ceptions.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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ever, several exceptions to the warrant requirement, including the private 
search doctrine.10 The private search doctrine can be traced to Walter v. 
United States, in which the Supreme Court hinted that police may be allowed 
to reexamine materials searched by a private person without first obtaining a 
warrant.11 Later, in United States v. Jacobsen, the Court officially announced 
that the private search doctrine was a formal exception to the warrant re-
quirement.12 
Under the private search doctrine, the police may reconstruct a private 
search without obtaining a warrant in advance.13 The Court reasoned that 
because the owner’s expectation of privacy was already frustrated by a pri-
vate search, the subsequent government search did not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment.14 The government search must remain within the same scope 
as the original private search unless the officer is “virtually certain” they will 
find similar evidence beyond the scope of the private search.15 In Jacobsen, 
the scope of the government search was limited to the physical container 
searched by private parties.16 But with new technology, the permissible scope 
of an electronic government search under the private search doctrine has be-
come a contested question among federal circuits.17 
Federal courts disagreed on the doctrine’s scope even before cases ap-
plied the private search doctrine to electronic devices.18 The dispute over the 
scope of the doctrine intensified when searches became electronic in na-
 
 10. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011) (exigent circumstances); Illinois v. 
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (consent); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 444 
(1971) (plain view); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to arrest); Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk). 
 11. 447 U.S. 649, 657 (1980). 
 12. 466 U.S. at 119. 
 13. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 119. The Court in Jacobsen distinguished a private search from 
a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment only proscribes govern-
ment action; therefore, a search conducted by a private individual not acting as a government 
agent does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 113. 
 14. Id. at 120. See generally Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 15. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 119 (“[T]here was a virtual certainty that nothing else of 
significance was in the package and that a manual inspection of the tube and its contents 
would not tell him anything more than he already had been told.”). 
 16. See id. (“Respondents could have no privacy interest in the contents of the package, 
since it remained unsealed and since the Federal Express employees had just examined the 
package . . . .”). 
 17. See Matthew A. Lupo, Privacy in the Digital Age: Preserving the Fourth Amendment 
by Resolving the Circuit Split over the Private-Search Doctrine, 10 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 414, 415 
(2017). 
 18. Compare United States v. Rouse, 148 F.3d 1040, 1041 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
the government searchers exceeded the scope of a private search because they had no previous 
information about some of the items they searched), with United States v. Simpson, 904 F.2d 
607, 610 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that the government searchers did not exceed the scope of a 
private search “simply because they took more time and were more thorough than” the private 
searchers). 
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ture.19 Computers, smartphones, and various other electronic devices are 
like digital containers that can store an immense amount of information.20 
The difference in nature between an electronic device, such as a computer, 
and a physical container, such as a cardboard shipping box, has renewed the 
debate over how courts should strike the balance between individual privacy 
interests and important government interests under the private search doc-
trine. If the Jacobsen container-based approach is to be preserved, the fun-
damental question is: What is the electronic equivalent of a physical 
container? 
This Note argues that the scope of the private search doctrine as applied 
to electronics should be limited to only the exact data viewed by the private 
searcher. Part I discusses the current circuit split over how the private search 
doctrine applies to electronic devices and contrasts how different circuits 
have defined an electronic “container.” Part II analyzes how Carpenter’s lim-
itation on the third-party doctrine will affect the private search doctrine’s 
scope. Part III argues that the Court should resolve the circuit split by adopt-
ing a narrow rule that defines an electronic “container” as only the exact data 
viewed by the private searcher and limits the scope of the government search 
to just the data exposed on a device’s screen. 
I. THE DIFFICULTY OF DEFINING AN ELECTRONIC “CONTAINER” 
When the Supreme Court established the private search doctrine in 
1984, it did not consider how the doctrine would apply to electronic devic-
es.21 This lack of foresight left lower courts to decide how to apply the doc-
trine to electronic devices as technology developed rapidly. The Fifth and 
Seventh Circuits have adopted a rule that allows the government to search 
the entire electronic device after a private search.22 The Sixth and Eleventh 
Circuits have adopted a rule that allows the government to search only the 
data that a private searcher viewed.23 This Part will discuss the two ap-
proaches to defining an electronic “container”—a bright-line rule and a 
more flexible standard. 
The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Runyan outlines one side 
of the circuit split.24 The Fifth Circuit was the first to apply the private search 
 
 19. See Alexandra Gioseffi, Comment, Lichtenberger, Sparks, and Wicks: The Future of 
the Private Search Doctrine, 66 EMORY L.J. 395, 399 (2017). 
 20. See Benjamin Holley, Note, Digitizing the Fourth Amendment: Limiting the Private 
Search Exception in Computer Investigations, 96 VA. L. REV. 677, 682 (2010). 
 21. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109. 
 22. Brianna M. Espeland, Implications of the Private Search Doctrine in a Digital Age: 
Advocating for Limitations on Warrantless Searches Through Adoption of the Virtual File Ap-
proach, 53 IDAHO L. REV. 777, 781 (2017). 
 23. Id. at 782. 
 24. 275 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2001). The electronic devices at issue in Runyan were CDs 
and floppy disks. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 453. 
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doctrine to electronic devices, doing so in 2001.25 The Fifth Circuit took the 
view that an electronic device (in this case, a CD or floppy disk) is a “con-
tainer,” similar to the physical shipping box at issue in Jacobsen.26 The court 
treated each CD or floppy disk as a separate “container.”27 Once a private 
searcher accessed the disk, the government could search the entire device.28 
The court reasoned that defining an entire device as a “container” created a 
clear and administrable rule.29 Additionally, this rule would “preserve[] the 
competing objectives underlying the Fourth Amendment’s protections 
against warrantless police searches.”30 The court’s approach protects a de-
fendant’s expectation of privacy in containers unopened by a private search-
er31 and “discourages police from going on ‘fishing expeditions’ by opening 
closed containers.”32 The Runyan rule is clear and administrable, but it is 
loosely tailored and exposes excess data to government searches.33 
The Runyan rule has been cited as persuasive precedent in other federal 
courts. The rule created in Runyan was explicitly adopted by the Seventh 
Circuit in Rann v. Atchison.34 In Rann, the court held that the police would 
not exceed the scope of a private search if they viewed the entire contents of 
a zip drive and a camera memory card.35 The Runyan rule has also been 
adopted by district courts outside the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. For exam-
ple, the Northern District of California cited the Runyan rule as persuasive 
 
 25. See id. at 461 (“Due to the lack of definitive guidance from the Supreme Court and 
the lack of consensus among our sister circuits regarding the precise nature of the evaluation 
required, we must tread carefully in our disposition of this issue.”); see also Espeland, supra 
note 22, at 796–815 (outlining the circuit decisions applying the private search doctrine to elec-
tronic devices). 
 26. See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 463–64 (discussing the container-based approach in Jacob-
sen and applying that approach to CDs and floppy disks). 
 27. See id. at 464 (finding that any evidence police obtained from each disk not searched 
by the private searchers was potentially subject to suppression). 
 28. See id. at 463 (“[T]he police exceed the scope of a prior private search when they 
examine a closed container that was not opened by the private searchers . . . .”). 
 29. See id. at 464–65 (“Any evidence that police obtain from a closed container that was 
unopened by prior private searchers will be suppressed unless they can demonstrate to a re-
viewing court that an exception to the exclusionary rule is warranted . . . .”). 
 30. Id. at 463. 
 31. Id. at 463–64. 
 32. Id. at 464. 
 33. See Lupo, supra note 17, at 427 (“[I]n United States v. Runyan, the Fifth Circuit held 
that a private searcher who opened only a few files on a computer had effectively searched the 
entire hard drive. As a consequence, it was irrelevant that police opened storage files different 
than those the original private searcher had opened . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 34. 689 F.3d 832, 837 (7th Cir. 2012) (“We find the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Runyan to 
be persuasive, and we adopt it.”). 
 35. Rann, 689 F.3d at 838 (“[E]ven if the police more thoroughly searched the digital 
media devices than S.R. and her mother did and viewed images that S.R. or her mother had not 
viewed, per the holding in Runyan, the police search did not exceed or expand the scope of the 
initial private searches.”). 
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precedent in United States v. Guindi.36 The court in Guindi, however, re-
frained from fully adopting the Runyan rule and emphasized that the private 
searcher in that case had viewed almost every file on the CDs before the gov-
ernment search.37 Thus, the Runyan rule embodies one side of the circuit 
split over how the private search doctrine applies to electronic devices. 
The Sixth Circuit articulates the other side in United States v. Lichten-
berger.38 The court in Lichtenberger found that the police exceeded the scope 
of a private search when they searched an entire laptop.39 Instead of applying 
the container-based approach from Jacobsen, the court focused on the “vir-
tual certainty” language used in Jacobsen.40 The Lichtenberger court reasoned 
that because a laptop has the capacity to hold vast amounts of information, 
the threshold of “virtual certainty” to search beyond what the private search-
er viewed was a high bar to meet.41 Additionally, the court argued that the 
larger storage capacity of the laptop greatly increased the privacy interests of 
the defendant.42 The Lichtenberger standard limits the government search to 
just the data viewed by a private searcher, and the government cannot search 
beyond that data without a warrant unless they are “virtually certain” of 
what they will find.43 This standard provides more protection for individual 
privacy interests but lacks the clarity of the Runyan rule because it requires a 
fact-intensive analysis into what a private searcher actually viewed.44 
The Lichtenberger standard has been both implicitly and explicitly 
adopted by other federal courts. The Eleventh Circuit took a similar ap-
proach in United States v. Sparks but did not cite to Lichtenberger specifical-
ly.45 In Sparks, the Eleventh Circuit found that the police exceeded the scope 
 
 36. 554 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“This Court finds Runyan to be partic-
ularly on point.”). 
 37. Guindi, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 1025. 
 38. 786 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 39. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 491. 
 40. Id. at 488 (“Officer Huston had to proceed with ‘virtual certainty’ that the ‘inspec-
tion of the [laptop] and its contents would not tell [him] anything more than he already had 
been told [by Holmes.]’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 
109, 119 (1984))). 
 41. See id. at 488–89 (discussing the low probability that a previously unopened file on 
the laptop would contain similar images of child pornography). 
 42. See id. (“[T]here was a very real possibility Officer Huston . . . could have discovered 
something else on Lichtenberger’s laptop that was private, legal, and unrelated to the allega-
tions prompting the search—precisely the sort of discovery the Jacobsen Court sought to 
avoid . . . .”); see also id. at 489 (“The same folders . . . could have contained, for example, ex-
plicit photos of Lichtenberger himself: legal, unrelated to the crime alleged, and the most pri-
vate sort of images. Other documents, such as bank statements or personal communications, 
could also have been discovered among the photographs.”). 
 43. See John M. Walton III, Note, Virtually Certain to Frustrate: The Application of the 
Private Search Doctrine to Computers and Computer Storage Devices, 43 N. KY. L. REV. 465, 
479–80 (2016). 
 44. See id. at 489–90. 
 45. 806 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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of a private search by viewing a video stored on a cell phone that the private 
searcher had not viewed.46 The police did not exceed the scope of the private 
search, however, by viewing photos and videos that the private searcher al-
ready viewed.47 Implicitly, the Sparks ruling endorsed the Lichtenberger 
standard that only the data viewed by a private searcher can be searched by 
the government unless the police have “virtual certainty” of what they will 
find outside the original data viewed. 
Two district courts outside of the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits also en-
dorsed a standard similar to the Lichtenberger standard. Seven years before 
the Sixth Circuit decided Lichtenberger, the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
adopted a similar approach in United States v. Crist.48 The Crist court held 
that the police exceeded the scope of a private search when officers searched 
the entire hard drive of a computer on which a private searcher had only 
viewed a couple of videos.49 The court also distinguished the Runyan rule by 
stating that “[a] hard drive is not analogous to an individual disk. Rather, a 
hard drive is comprised of many platters, or magnetic data storage units, 
mounted together. Each platter, as opposed to the hard drive in its entirety, 
is analogous to a single disk as discussed in Runyan.”50 The Crist court rea-
soned that the privacy interests of the defendant would not be adequately 
protected by analogizing the entire hard drive to a single container.51 Crist 
highlighted concerns over applying the Runyan rule to evolving technolo-
gy—concerns that, after seven additional years of technological evolution, 
would later influence the Lichtenberger analysis. In addition to implicit en-
dorsements of the Lichtenberger standard by several courts, the District of 
Puerto Rico explicitly adopted the standard in United States v. Rivera-
Morales.52 Overall, the Lichtenberger standard embodies the other side of the 
circuit split on how the private search doctrine applies to electronic devices. 
Determining the extent to which the concept of physical containment 
applies to electronic storage is the key issue animating the circuit split. To 
determine the scope of a permissible reconstruction, a court must define a 
“container” for electronic data.53 This definition is not obvious. The Court in 
Jacobsen struggled to define the bounds of a physical container.54 Even 
though there was a closed tube containing bags of drugs within the shipping 
 
 46. Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1336. 
 47. Id. 
 48. 627 F. Supp. 2d 575 (M.D. Pa. 2008). 
 49. Crist, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 585–86. 
 50. Id. at 586. 
 51. See id. (“While Crist’s privacy interest was lost as to the ‘couple of videos’ opened by 
Hipple, it is no foregone conclusion that his privacy interest was compromised as to all the 
computer’s remaining contents.”). 
 52. See 166 F. Supp. 3d 154, 166 (D.P.R. 2015) (describing the Lichtenberger standard as 
“after-the-fact confirmation of a private search”). 
 53. Espeland, supra note 22, at 781. 
 54. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120 n.17 (1984). 
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box, the Court ultimately chose to define the scope of the permissible search 
by the physical boundaries of the shipping box and found that opening the 
tube did not go beyond that scope.55 A box-within-a-box scenario compli-
cates the analysis of the scope of a search, and electronic devices increasingly 
convolute this assessment.56 
Electronic devices act like Russian nesting dolls.57 They can almost infi-
nitely subdivide their contents into smaller and smaller groups.58 The bigger 
and more complex the device, the more complicated this boxes-within-boxes 
nesting can get. For example, on any standard laptop a single picture could 
be stored in the following way: “Files”–“Documents”–“Folder X”–“Folder 
Y”–“Folder Z”–“Document A”–“Page 25”–“Picture.” This is only one of an 
almost infinite number of possible organizational schemes, not to mention 
the possibility of duplicate documents or files stored under different labels. 
The question, however, remains the same as that in the Jacobsen case: At 
which subdivision does an expectation of privacy become frustrated?59 
It cannot be the case that every possible item capable of holding others is 
its own container. Neither the size of the shipping box nor the potential 
number of smaller boxes it could hold influenced the Jacobsen Court’s de-
termination.60 The Court’s silence regarding these factors could imply that 
they do not change the analysis. Or the silence could simply be a product of 
the specific facts of the case, such that the factors could potentially change 
the container analysis under different circumstances. 
The circuit split in the electronic context highlights both interpretations 
of the Court’s silence on the size and capacity factors. The courts in Runyan 
and Rann primarily focused on clearly defining the scope of a search.61 Tai-
loring the analysis based on the storage capacity of devices would only serve 
to create uncertainty for police officers in the field and potentially interfere 
with efficient investigations.62 On the other hand, the courts in Lichtenberger 
 
 55. Id. at 120. 
 56. See Holley, supra note 20, at 682–83; Walton, supra note 43, at 487–88. 
 57. Holley, supra note 20, at 682–83. 
 58. See id. at 682. 
 59. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 121 (“[T]he package could no longer support any expecta-
tion of privacy; it was just like a balloon ‘the distinctive character [of which] spoke volumes as 
to its contents—particularly to the trained eye of the officer.’ ” (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 
U.S. 730, 743 (1983) (plurality opinion))). 
 60. See id. at 118–19 (“Even if the white powder was not itself in ‘plain view’ because it 
was still enclosed in so many containers and covered with papers, there was a virtual certainty 
that nothing else of significance was in the package . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 61. See United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 461–63 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he police 
exceed the scope of a prior private search when they examine a closed container that was not 
opened by the private searchers unless the police are already substantially certain of what is 
inside that container based on the statements of the private searchers, their replication of the 
private search, and their expertise.”); see also Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 837 (7th Cir. 
2012) (adopting the holding of Runyan). 
 62. See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465 (arguing that if the police exceeded the scope of the pri-
vate search every time they encountered an item in the container that the private searcher did 
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and Sparks primarily focused on limiting the types of information exposed to 
a warrantless search.63 The devices in those cases had large storage capacities, 
and that fact fundamentally changed the courts’ container analysis.64 Under 
this type of analysis, clear, workable rules are considered a secondary con-
cern because electronics are viewed as Fourth Amendment game-changers.65 
Without a clear definition of an electronic container, lower courts will con-
tinue to struggle with size and capacity factors when applying Jacobsen to 
electronic private searches. The Supreme Court will need to decide whether 
size and capacity factors change the Jacobsen analysis when applied to elec-
tronics and clearly define the scope of an electronic “container” in order to 
resolve this circuit split. 
II. QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCES: CARPENTER’S DIVIDING 
LINE 
If the Supreme Court does resolve this circuit split, the Carpenter opin-
ion’s heavy emphasis on the unique nature of CSLI records should greatly 
influence its analysis of the private search doctrine as applied to electronic 
devices. This Part explains the relationship between the private search and 
third-party doctrines, analyzing how the quantity and quality of information 
stored on electronic devices affects Fourth Amendment analysis. It argues 
that the circuit split should be resolved based on the logic of Carpenter. 
The Jacobsen Court used reasoning similar to that underlying the third-
party doctrine when creating the private search doctrine.66 The third-party 
doctrine is based on the idea that a person does not have a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in any information that they voluntarily disclose to a third 
party.67 The private search doctrine, by contrast, does not contain a volun-
 
not find, the result “would over-deter the police, preventing them from engaging in lawful in-
vestigation of containers where any reasonable expectation of privacy has already been erod-
ed”). 
 63. See United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015) (“While Widner’s 
private search of the cell phone might have removed certain information from the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections, it did not expose every part of the information contained in the cell 
phone.”); United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 489 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[Folders searched 
on the laptop] could have contained, for example, explicit photos of Lichtenberger himself: 
legal, unrelated to the crime alleged, and the most private sort of images. Other documents, 
such as bank statements or personal communications, could also have been discovered among 
the photographs. . . . The reality of modern data storage is that the possibilities are expan-
sive.”). 
 64. Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1336 (discussing the large storage capacity of cell phones, the 
range of information types cell phones are able to store, and the potentially intimate nature of 
that information); Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 488 (discussing the many types of data computers 
are able to store in vast amounts for long periods of time). 
 65. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 486–87 (“[S]earches of physical spaces and the items they 
contain differ in significant ways from searches of complex electronic devices under the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
 66. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984). 
 67. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 
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tariness requirement—it generally applies to situations where a person did 
not give a third party permission to access their information.68 The lack of a 
voluntariness element arguably creates a greater individual privacy interest 
in the private search doctrine than in the third-party doctrine. In a govern-
ment search under the former, the individual did not necessarily intend to 
share their information with a third party and assume the risk that the third 
party would disclose that information to the police. Notably, the Court in 
Carpenter, when analyzing third-party doctrine, found that CSLI is not vol-
untarily shared by cell phone users and gave greater protection to privacy 
interests as a result.69 At the very least, individual privacy interests under the 
private search doctrine are on par with those under the third-party doctrine. 
But can the logic applied in Carpenter be applied to the private search doc-
trine? 
Carpenter focused on the uniqueness of CSLI and technological advanc-
es generally.70 The Court emphasized “the seismic shifts in digital technology 
that made possible the tracking of not only Carpenter’s location but also eve-
ryone else’s, not for a short period but for years and years.”71 These “seismic 
shifts” made CSLI a “distinct category of information” to which the Court 
declined to extend the third-party doctrine.72 Carpenter was not the first 
time that the Court limited an established doctrine under the Fourth 
Amendment due to the quantity and quality of information made available 
through digital technology. The Court in Riley v. California found that the 
high storage capacity of electronic devices and their ability to connect to the 
internet made them categorically different from other physical items.73 The 
Riley Court declined to extend the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the 
 
 68. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 130 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (arguing that the analogy between the third-party doctrine and the private search 
doctrine “is imperfect since the risks assumed by a person whose belongings are subjected to a 
private search are not comparable to those assumed by one who voluntarily chooses to reveal 
his secrets to a companion”). 
 69. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (“[A] cell phone logs a cell-
site record by dint of its operation, without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond 
powering up. Virtually any activity on the phone generates CSLI, including incoming calls, 
texts, or e-mails and countless other data connections that a phone automatically makes when 
checking for news, weather, or social media updates. Apart from disconnecting the phone from 
the network, there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data. As a result, in no 
meaningful sense does the user voluntarily ‘assume[] the risk’ of turning over a comprehensive 
dossier of his physical movements.” (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735, 745 (1979))). 
 70. See id. at 2219 (“While the records in this case reflect the state of technology at the 
start of the decade, the accuracy of CSLI is rapidly approaching GPS-level precision. . . . 
[W]ireless carriers already have the capability to pinpoint a phone’s location within 50 me-
ters.”). 
 71. Id. (emphasis added). 
 72. Id. at 2219–20. 
 73. 573 U.S. 373, 393–97 (2014) (discussing the vast amount of information that elec-
tronics can store and how the internet can store even more information). 
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warrant requirement and held that police must obtain a warrant before digi-
tally searching electronic devices incident to arrest.74 Taken together, Car-
penter and Riley signal that digital technology is a turning point for Fourth 
Amendment law. 
Many scholars have argued that electronics are qualitatively different 
from other physical items and should be treated differently under the Fourth 
Amendment.75 Their argument centers on the fact that “[m]odern comput-
ers are able to store vast amounts of information, equal to approximately 
eighty million pages of text, with capacity doubling approximately every two 
years.”76 Not only do electronic devices have astonishingly large storage ca-
pacities, they contain an immense amount of personal information and hold 
“the privacies of life.”77 Any given smartphone might hold “a wealth of detail 
about [one’s] familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associa-
tions.”78 Professor Orin Kerr argues that digital searches of electronic devices 
are more invasive of privacy interests than searches of the home.79 Accord-
ing to Kerr, the need to create different Fourth Amendment rules for digital 
technology will become self-evident as technology continues to advance.80 
The qualitative differences between digital devices and other physical 
objects are further underscored by the fact that most digital devices can con-
nect to the internet.81 The Court in Riley expressed concern over how an in-
ternet connection could drastically change the nature of a search.82 In Riley, 
Chief Justice Roberts stated that the analogy of a cell phone to a container 
“crumbles entirely when a cell phone is used to access data located else-
 
 74. Riley, 573 U.S. at 401–03. It should be noted that both Lichtenberger and Sparks cit-
ed the Riley decision as part of their reasoning. United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1336 
(11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 487 (6th Cir. 2015). Additional-
ly, both Runyan and Rann were decided years before Riley, so the Riley decision could poten-
tially alter the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ analysis in the future. 
 75. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
531 (2005). 
 76. Holley, supra note 20, at 682 (footnotes omitted) (“For context, this is more infor-
mation than is contained in one floor’s worth of academic journals in the average university 
library.” (footnote omitted)). 
 77. Riley, 573 U.S. at 403 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)); Orin 
S. Kerr, Foreword: Accounting for Technological Change, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 405 
(2013) (“Much of the information stored in a person’s cellular phone is deeply personal. The 
information can include photographs, text messages, e-mails, personal notes, records of visited 
websites, and many other kinds of personal information.”). 
 78. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 79. See Kerr, supra note 75, at 569. 
 80. Kerr, supra note 77, at 407–08 (“Over time, advancing technology will cause the dig-
ital to seem more and more different from the physical. The need for different rules governing 
digital devices eventually will seem obvious.”). 
 81. See Andrew Meola, What is the Internet of Things (IoT)? Meaning & Definition, BUS. 
INSIDER (May 10, 2018, 1:06 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/internet-of-things-
definition [https://perma.cc/FDG4-E92W]. 
 82. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 397. 
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where, at the tap of a screen.”83 “Cloud computing,” the ability of “Internet-
connected devices to display data stored on remote servers rather than on 
the device itself,” is a good example.84 The rise of cloud computing has al-
tered our understanding of what it means for information to be contained on 
a device because “[c]ell phone users often may not know whether particular 
information is stored on the device or in the cloud, and it generally makes 
little difference.”85 These device features are why many argue that the Jacob-
sen standard should be limited to physical containers only.86 In Jacobsen, the 
police could not open any other box and find the exact same drugs that were 
inside the shipping box. If a person can access “the cloud” from any device 
that can connect to the internet, the analogy of electronics to containers 
breaks down at a fundamental level. 
Beyond the quantitative and qualitative factors, Carpenter’s logic regard-
ing voluntariness can be applied to the private search circuit split as well. 
Cell phones and electronic devices are pervasive in society.87 That fact has 
not gone unnoticed by the Court.88 In Carpenter, the Court went so far as to 
say that “carrying [a cell phone] is indispensable to participation in modern 
society.”89 The indispensable nature of cell phones and electronic devices in 
modern society decreases the likelihood that a person is knowingly assuming 
the risk that a third party will view their information. In fact, most people 
carry their mobile devices on their person for nearly twenty-four hours a 
day90—effectively keeping them away from third parties. In essence, our 
electronic devices have become extensions of ourselves. They follow us 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See, e.g., Dylan Bonfigli, Note, Get a Warrant: A Bright-Line Rule for Digital Searches 
Under the Private-Search Doctrine, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 331 (2017) (“Because of the differ-
ences in privacy concerns, courts should not treat personal computers in the same way as the 
cardboard box in Jacobsen and other physical containers.”); Walton, supra note 43, at 493 
(“Due to the extensive privacy interests at stake, and the impracticability of applying the pri-
vate search doctrine to computers—under either the physical device approach or the data or 
file approach—courts should preclude the government’s use of the private search doctrine 
when the ‘container’ involved is a computer.”). 
 87. See Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/
fact-sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/G6XC-JYFZ] (stating that 95% of U.S. adults own a cell 
phone, 77% own a smartphone, 73% own desktop or laptop computers, and 53% own a tablet 
computer). 
 88. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 395 (“According to one poll, nearly three-quarters of smart 
phone users report being within five feet of their phones most of the time, with 12% admitting 
that they even use their phones in the shower.”). 
 89. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018). 
 90. See id. at 2218 (“[T]hey compulsively carry cell phones with them all the time. A cell 
phone faithfully follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences, 
doctor’s offices, political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.”). 
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wherever we go and record our lives in detail.91 The deeply personal nature 
of the contents of electronic devices and their immense storage capacity 
weigh heavily in favor of applying a Carpenter-like rule to the private search 
doctrine, despite the fact that the doctrine does not have a voluntariness re-
quirement. The Carpenter Court recognized that technological advance-
ments change the Fourth Amendment balancing act due to large shifts in 
privacy interests.92 It is time for the Court to do the same with the private 
search doctrine. 
III. CREATING A NARROW ELECTRONIC PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE 
The private search doctrine must be very narrowly applied to electronic 
devices. The Court should use the logic of Carpenter, in the context of the 
third-party doctrine, to narrow the scope of the private search doctrine be-
cause of the close relationship between those two doctrines. The original bal-
ance of interests struck in Jacobsen must be altered to give sufficient 
protection to privacy interests in this new context. This Part proposes a nar-
row rule in order to resolve the circuit split, addresses possible counterar-
guments, and provides policy justifications for the proposed rule. 
The scope of a digital government search should be limited to just the 
data viewed by a private searcher. This rule is based on Professor Kerr’s ex-
posed-data approach to digital searches generally.93 Kerr’s argument is based 
on the concept of plain view: if the officer does not have a warrant to search 
the computer, the scope of his search authority is limited to just that infor-
mation displayed on the screen without any manipulation by the officer.94 
This supports narrowing the private search doctrine for electronic devices 
because the Court in Jacobsen cited to the plain view doctrine when creating 
the private search doctrine.95 Thus, when a private party shows a govern-
ment agent data related to criminal activity, the government agent is allowed 
to view what is exposed on the screen, so long as what is shown is what the 
private party previously saw. No other data can be viewed, and the agent 
 
 91. See, e.g., Jennifer Valentino-DeVries et al., Your Apps Know Where You Were Last 
Night, and They’re Not Keeping It Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/10/business/location-data-privacy-apps.html 
(on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 92. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (“[This case] is about a detailed chronicle of a per-
son’s physical presence compiled every day, every moment, over several years. Such a chronicle 
implicates privacy concerns far beyond those considered in Smith or Miller.”). 
 93. See Kerr, supra note 75, at 556–57 (“The scope of a computer search should be 
whatever information appears on the output device, whether that output device is a screen, 
printer, or something else. Under this approach, scrolling down a word processing file to see 
parts of the file that were previously hidden is a distinct search of the rest of the file.”). 
 94. See id. (discussing the fact that searches of any kind are generally related to human 
observation and that data can be organized in many different ways). 
 95. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 119–20 (1984) (citing Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487–90 (1971)) (“The agent’s viewing of what a private party had 
freely made available for his inspection did not violate the Fourth Amendment.”). 
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cannot manipulate the screen in any way in order to expose more data. In 
order to search more, the agent must get a warrant.96 
This bright-line rule comes with practical downsides. Under the pro-
posed rule, police will likely have difficulty proving exactly what was on a 
screen during a private search. For instance, if a private searcher closes a file 
or turns off a device after finding evidence of a crime, the police will have to 
use extreme caution to reconstruct the private search. Police will have to ask 
the private searcher, “Can you show me exactly what you saw?” and engage 
in a factual inquiry that retraces the exact steps of the private searcher. 
Scrolling, clicking, or opening files will only be allowed if the private search-
er performed those same actions previously. If the private searcher cannot 
remember their exact steps, the officer must stop and get a warrant to finish 
searching the device.97 The ban on independent officer manipulation thus 
eliminates any discretion to widen the scope of a search. 
This nonmanipulation rule is likely to impose a warrant requirement on 
a large swath of previously permissible searches under the private search 
doctrine. Some might even argue that the ban on independent officer ma-
nipulation will virtually eviscerate the private search doctrine because private 
searchers often do not remember exactly what they opened before finding 
the contraband or evidence.98 While descriptions from a private searcher can 
be used as evidence to support a warrant application,99 establishing probable 
cause could still be difficult without an officer’s firsthand observations. 
These concerns are valid, but the proposed rule only requires officers to fol-
low the same nonmanipulation principles in the digital world as they already 
do in the physical world. 
These principles are most clearly presented by the plain view doctrine. If 
officers are legally authorized to be in a space, they are allowed to seize any 
contraband or evidence in plain view.100 But officers are not allowed to abuse 
the doctrine by manipulating their surroundings in order to broaden their 
 
 96. Unless another exception to the warrant requirement, such as exigency, applies. 
 97. See Kerr, supra note 75, at 556–57. 
 98. Cf. Adam A. Bereston, Comment, The Private Search Doctrine and the Evolution of 
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence in the Face of New Technology: A Broad or Narrow Excep-
tion?, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 472–73 (2016) (“When a private searcher cannot be certain 
whether the images shown to police are among the same images viewed during the initial pri-
vate search, otherwise reasonable police conduct would be held unreasonable . . . . The afore-
mentioned factual quandary created by this demanding standard may very well signal the 
death of the private search doctrine.”). 
 99. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (“The task of the issuing magistrate is 
simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set 
forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons 
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 
crime will be found in a particular place.”). 
 100. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (“What the ‘plain view’ cases 
have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intru-
sion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the 
accused.”). 
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search.101 For example, the Supreme Court found that moving objects in or-
der to view the serial number of a stereo was impermissibly manipulative 
under the plain view doctrine.102 And under the related plain feel doctrine, 
officers cannot manipulate an item in a person’s pocket during a Terry pat 
down in order to determine its contents.103 Because the private search doc-
trine was created using reasoning similar to the plain view doctrine,104 it fol-
lows that similar nonmanipulation principles should be extended to the 
private search context. The proposed rule places no more restrictions on of-
ficers in the digital context than in the physical world. 
Another notable downside of the proposed rule is that its screen-based 
approach prevents officers from accessing metadata without a warrant. 
Metadata is “data about data.”105 It is used to “organize, manage, and facili-
tate the use and understanding of primary data.”106 Metadata typically does 
not appear on paper printouts of electronic files or on the screen when elec-
tronic files are opened.107 Consequently, it is highly unlikely that a private 
searcher will ever see metadata during their initial search—thus requiring an 
officer to get a warrant before searching for that information. Metadata can 
be some of the most useful information to law enforcement.108 The proposed 
rule will restrict police access to this useful information, but that is the cost 
that the Fourth Amendment requires in order to protect twenty-first century 
privacy interests. Police will still have tools available to get this coveted in-
formation: warrants and other exceptions to the warrant requirement.109 
Despite its downsides, a narrow electronic private search doctrine pre-
serves the central logic of Jacobsen but more effectively protects twenty-first 
century privacy interests by extending the logic of Carpenter. The logic of 
Jacobsen is straightforward: (1) A private party does not violate the Fourth 
 
 101. See id. (“[T]he ‘plan view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory 
search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.”). 
 102. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324–25 (1987). 
 103. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 379 (1993). 
 104. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 105. Adam K. Israel, Note, To Scrub or Not to Scrub: The Ethical Implications of Metada-
ta and Electronic Data Creation, Exchange, and Discovery, 60 ALA. L. REV. 469, 469–70 (2009) 
(“For example, metadata often reports the author’s name and initials; the name of the company 
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any digital comments made on the document; document versions; and hidden text.”). 
 106. Metadata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 107. GEORGE L. PAUL & BRUCE H. NEARON, THE DISCOVERY REVOLUTION: E-DISCOVERY 
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 100 (2006); Steven C. Bennett & 
Jeremy Cloud, Coping with Metadata: Ten Key Steps, 61 MERCER L. REV. 471, 471 (2010). 
 108. See, e.g., Parmy Olson, Apple’s Messages Metadata Could Be Valuable to Law En-
forcement, FORBES (Sept. 29, 2016, 1:07 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2016/
09/29/apples-messages-metadata-could-be-valuable-to-law-enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/
82KA-BJQ9]. 
 109. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text. 
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Amendment by searching the property of another;110 (2) A person loses their 
expectation of privacy in information that a third party reveals to govern-
ment officials;111 (3) “Once frustration of the original expectation of privacy 
occurs, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of the 
now nonprivate information.”112 The scope of what is nonprivate infor-
mation during the government’s subsequent search is what has caused the 
circuit split. 
This is where Carpenter’s logic applies. The Carpenter Court focused on 
the fact that “the retrospective quality of the data here gives police access to a 
category of information otherwise unknowable.”113 If the scope of the gov-
ernment search is allowed to be any wider than the exposed and previously 
viewed data, there is a greater risk that the agent will view information un-
known to the private searcher. That information might be of a completely 
different character than the previously searched data,114 and the owner’s ex-
pectation of privacy in that information might not be frustrated. The pro-
posed rule makes Jacobsen’s “virtual certainty” standard into a bright-line 
rule by clearly stating that in the digital context, police can never be “virtual-
ly certain” of what they will find outside of the exposed and previously 
searched data.115 For example, if while reconstructing a private search an of-
ficer sees an unopened file labeled “Murder Details,” the officer would not be 
able to open the file under the proposed rule. The officer could not be “virtu-
ally certain” of the file’s contents based on the label alone.116 The best way to 
ensure that police do not use the window of nonprivate information con-
veyed by a private searcher to break into an entire warehouse of private in-
formation is to make the window as small as possible. 
In order to protect the heightened privacy interests in the digital context, 
this rule does not extend the Jacobsen container-based approach. Although 
 
 110. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113–14 (1984) (quoting Walter v. United 
States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
 111. Id. at 117. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018). 
 114. Cf. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) (“Disclosed in [GPS] da-
ta . . . will be trips the indisputably private nature of which takes little imagination to conjure: 
trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the 
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 115. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 119. This bright-line rule distinguishes the proposal of this 
Note from the Lichtenberger standard. The Lichtenberger standard is narrow in scope, but it 
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479–80. 
 116. Cf. RayMing Chang, Why the Plain View Doctrine Should Not Apply to Digital Evi-
dence, 12 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 31, 51 (2007) (“Criminals can easily hide evidence 
by mislabeling files. It is unlikely that a suspect will label a file ‘evidence-of-a-crime.doc’ or 
some other variation that clearly indicates that the file contains pertinent evidence. Additional-
ly, evidence of a crime can be found in almost any type of file.” (footnote omitted)). 
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the container-based approach provides a clear, administrable rule for law en-
forcement,117 it sacrifices significant privacy interests. There is concern that a 
narrow rule will overdeter police and make officers reluctant to conduct a 
search under the private search doctrine at all for fear of mistakenly finding 
evidence that could later be suppressed at trial.118 This concern is misplaced. 
A narrow rule will provide the police with more guidance about what is and 
is not a valid search under the private search doctrine. Giving the police wide 
discretion under the container-based approach will cause numerous sup-
pression issues because courts can question every decision officers make 
during such broad searches. A narrow approach eliminates the discretionary 
element of a search and will likely reduce the number of suppression issues. 
Even if the narrow approach deters police from taking arguably reasonable 
action, that is not necessarily a bad outcome.119 Promoting caution before 
searching through what could amount to an entire chronicle of someone’s 
life restrains government overreach into individual privacy. 
The narrow approach is also criticized for wasting time and resources by 
forcing police to obtain warrants based on limited information.120 But there 
is no evidence that the administrative costs of obtaining warrants are astro-
nomically large. Notably, many scholars have argued that the probable cause 
standard articulated in Illinois v. Gates121 makes obtaining a warrant easier in 
the modern age.122 Additionally, many states and the federal government 
permit police to obtain a warrant by telephone—greatly reducing time and 
resource costs.123 Although it might be inconvenient for officers to obtain a 
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narrow approach “would over-deter the police, preventing them from engaging in lawful in-
vestigation of containers where any reasonable expectation of privacy has already been erod-
ed”); Bereston, supra note 98, at 470 (arguing that a narrow approach “would lead police to be 
reluctant when conducting a subsequent search for fear that they will discover important evi-
dence that will be subject to suppression simply because the private searcher did not happen to 
discover that evidence during his or her initial search”). 
 119. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Binary Searches and the Central Meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 881, 883 (2014) (“For [Justice Frankfurter], the cen-
tral meaning of the Fourth Amendment, derived from its history, was that when discretion is 
afforded to law-enforcement officers to engage in search and seizure, it is all too likely to be 
abused, and accordingly searches and seizures not previously authorized by a warrant should 
be condemned in the absence of strict necessity.”). 
 120. See, e.g., Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465; Bereston, supra note 98, at 470–71. 
 121. 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983). 
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determined, for example, that both positive alerts from drug sniffing dogs and fingerprint 
matches are sufficient on their own, without any other evidence, to satisfy probable cause [un-
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 123. See Barbara C. Salken, Balancing Exigency and Privacy in Warrantless Searches to 
Prevent Destruction of Evidence: The Need for a Rule, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 283, 329 (1988); see also 
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warrant, mere inconvenience cannot outweigh the heightened privacy inter-
ests in these types of cases.124 Furthermore, many electronic private search 
cases involve easily recognizable contraband.125 In these cases, the police will 
already have enough information to obtain a search warrant for the entire 
device. And in truly time-sensitive cases, the police can use the exigent cir-
cumstances exception to the warrant requirement.126 
The narrow approach has the additional benefit of consistent application 
across all types of devices. Under the container-based approach, the scope of 
a search changes drastically if the device is a laptop or a CD.127 The proposed 
rule’s focus on the exposed data on the screen ensures that the scope of a 
search is sufficiently consistent across device types. Electronics are like ice-
bergs. What is exposed on the screen at any given time is only a fraction of 
what the entire device contains. Limiting police to the tip of the iceberg pre-
vents unfettered access merely because of a device’s storage capacity. 
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Perhaps one of the greatest benefits of the proposed rule—besides pro-
tecting privacy interests—is that it promotes more thorough government in-
vestigations. It creates the same incentives for police that exist under the 
exclusionary rule: if evidence is repeatedly suppressed, investigatory behav-
ior will adjust accordingly.128 In the long run, this narrow rule promotes evi-
dence gathering outside of the device itself in order to secure a warrant for 
the device. Better investigation practices benefit society because they help 
ensure that police action is based on facts rather than hunches and sloppy 
investigations.129 For example, a rule that encourages police to look for more 
evidence can combat confirmation bias.130 If police find evidence on an elec-
tronic device that supports their theory, they might be disinclined to fully 
consider an alternative theory or alibi evidence.131 Thus, while the proposed 
rule may impose additional procedural hurdles, it does so to the benefit of 
law enforcement investigations, not the cost. 
Finally, a narrow electronic private search doctrine complies with the 
spirit of the Fourth Amendment. As Justice Brennan described it, 
“[a]lthough the self-restraint and care exhibited by the officers . . . is com-
mendable, that alone can never be a sufficient protection for constitutional 
liberties.”132 The Fourth Amendment was not designed to make law en-
forcement’s job easy. It was designed as a barrier to the government’s natural 
tendency to expedite the criminal justice process at the expense of individual 
liberty.133 While the government’s interest in detecting crime and convicting 
criminals is strong, the Fourth Amendment requires that interest to out-
weigh the individual interest in privacy before it can be pursued through 
searches and seizures. In the context of digital devices and the private search 
doctrine, absent narrowly defined circumstances, the individual’s privacy in-
terest should always be protected. 
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CONCLUSION 
The scope of the private search doctrine has been contested since its in-
ception.134 The doctrine’s application in the digital world, however, has 
made the debate even more important. Under the private search doctrine, an 
individual who did not consent to third-party search of his or her device is 
exposed to a second government search.135 Under the container-based ap-
proach, an entire device could then be subject to government search without 
a warrant.136 This essentially opens a person’s entire life to government in-
spection without any judicial review.137 In order to prevent this enormous 
intrusion into a person’s privacy, the Court should create a narrow electronic 
private search doctrine. Requiring law enforcement to obtain a warrant if 
they wish to search an entire device is a necessary barrier to ensure that a 
small privacy intrusion by a third party does not open the door for extensive 
government intrusion into a digital chronicle of someone’s life. 
Technological advancements will continue to challenge the way we 
think about the Fourth Amendment. Digital devices have drastically changed 
everyday American life.138 Our devices are overflowing with our personal 
thoughts, movements, and contacts.139 As technology continues to evolve, 
Fourth Amendment doctrines will fail to meet the needs of modern society 
without significant alterations to account for ever-expanding digital worlds. 
The circuit split over how the private search doctrine applies to electronic 
devices is just one example of how technology challenges current Fourth 
Amendment doctrine.140 As the Carpenter decision demonstrated, just be-
cause an established doctrine can be applied in the electronic context does 
not mean that it should.141 As courts continue to confront difficult questions 
of Fourth Amendment law, they must use decisions like Carpenter as their 
guide to better protect privacy interests in the twenty-first century. 
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